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STANDARDS AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
David Friedman*
The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries ....
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, courts have tried to define the protec-
tion provided by copyright law to computer programs. One issue often
implicit and occasionally explicit in such cases is what protection, if
any, ought to be provided to standards, a kind of intellectual property
that does not fit neatly into the existing classifications. This Article first
attempts to explore the nature of intellectual property and intellectual
property law, then considers how standards fit into this analysis. As will
become clear, the objective at this point is not to produce clear answers
to the question of what the legal rules ought to be, but rather to show
how such answers might be produced and on what facts they would
depend.
The U.S. Constitution establishes two classes of intellectual prop-
erty: "Writings" and "Discoveries." 2 To protect them, Congress and
the courts have produced two bodies of law, copyright law for "writ-
ings" and patent law for "discoveries" or inventions. When the provi-
sions of Section 8 were embodied in the first copyright law, "writings"
meant written works, such as novels. As new forms of intellectual prop-
erty have become important, courts have placed them into one of the
two existing categories,3 provided them with special protection of their
own, 4 or left them unprotected.
* Visiting Professor, Cornell Law School.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2. Id.
3. Examples include films, audio recordings, and photographs, all of which are now covered
by copyright law, and the engineered bacteria that were the subject of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980), which the court concluded were patentable subject matter.
4. Examples include the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. § 911 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992), the 1930 Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1988) (protecting asexually repro-
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One approach to understanding how intellectual property law has
accommodated novel classes of intellectual creations is to ask whether
the novelties can reasonably be described as new kinds of writings or
inventions. This approach cannot explain the development of copyright
law for computer programs. It is clear, under current law, system
software in machine language form, code used to enable one part of a
computer to control another, is copyrightable. It is equally clear that
such software is not a writing, nor analogous to a writing. System
software is more nearly analogous to a machine part, such as an elabo-
rate cam.'
A better approach to explaining the development of intellectual
property law is to start by asking why writings are protected by copy-
right law. The Constitution does not specify how writings and discover-
ies are to be protected; it does not even suggest that they should be
protected in different ways by different bodies of law. If we understand
the features of writings that make the legal protection provided- by
copyright law appropriate to that sort of intellectual property, we can
then determine whether those features are shared by some new class of
intellectual property such as computer programs. If the same features
are shared, a good argument exists for categorizing the new sort of
property as "writings" and protecting it with copyright law, even if it is
a machine part or a plant variety.
This Article attempts to analyze standards under this approach.
Section II first discusses the general economic arguments for and
against protection of intellectual property; it then shows why each ar-
gument applies with different force to different sorts of intellectual
property. Section II concludes that it is logical to protect certain types
of intellectual property with something similar to copyright law, to pro-
duced plants), and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988) (protecting
sexually reproduced plants).
5. The analogy to a cam was made by Copyright Commissioner (and author) John Hersey
in his dissenting opinion in the final report of the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU). NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1978), reprinted in 5 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECH-
NOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD 60 (Nicholas Henry ed. 1980) [hereinafter CONTU]. Judge
Flaum in Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (N.D. Ill.
1979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980), described a machine language program on a ROM as
"a mechanical tool or machine part." Id. A pre-computer case reaching a similar result (for a roll
controlling a player piano) is White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
(1908). White-Smith was cited in some of the early computer copyright cases before the 1976
Copyright Act and its 1980 amendment made it clear that computer programs, in both source and
machine code form, were copyrightable.
6. Strictly speaking, an intellectual creation is not intellectual property unless it is pro-
tected. Intellectual creations that are left unprotected might more properly be described as "po-
tential intellectual property." For simplicity, throughout this Article, I will use "intellectual prop-
erty" to refer to both protected and unprotected forms.
[VOL. 19:31110
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tect other types of intellectual property with something similar to pat-
ent law, and to leave other types of intellectual property entirely unpro-
tected. Section III argues that computer programs, in both source and
object code form, are appropriately protected against literal copying by
a body of law similar to copyright law.
Section IV introduces standards, a class of intellectual property
that has not been recognized in the law as a separate and distinct cate-
gory, but has been at issue in many legal disputes over software.7 Sec-
tion V shows that whether standards ought to be protected, and if so in
what way, depends on factual questions whose answers are not entirely
clear. Section VI briefly summarizes how computer law has treated
standards. Section VII considers the implications of the analysis for
designing legal rules to apply to standards.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
We live in a society made up of many millions of people, each with
his own knowledge, desires, and resources. Any such society faces a
coordination problem: how to get people to coordinate their efforts in
order to achieve diverse objectives. While many solutions to that prob-
lem are conceivable, there seems to be only one solution that works
reasonably well for complicated societies: a decentralized system based
on the institutions of private property and trade.
In such a system, things belong to people and can be transferred
by them to other people. An exchange that transfers something to
someone who values it more than the previous owner produces a net
benefit, which may be shared between the parties to the exchange. The
system thus tends to move resources to those who most value them,
producing an efficient allocation of goods and services. The logic and
limitations of this process make up the branch of -economics called
price theory.8 In order for a private property system to work it is nec-
essary to define, enforce, and exchange property rights in the things
being allocated. If doing so is sufficiently difficult, the private property
7. The issue of standards has been discussed at some length in the economics literature,
largely under the rubric of "Network Externalities." See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Net-
work Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424-40 (1985). The
spring 1994 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, which should be available at about the
same time as the article you are reading, will contain a symposium on the subject of standards.
One of the articles, by S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, discusses the issue of ownership
of standards.
8. See, e.g., David D. Friedman, Price Theory: An Intermediate Text (2d ed. 1990).
1994] 1111
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solution to the coordination problem may work so poorly that other so-
lutions become preferable.9
One source of such difficulties is illustrated by Houston v. United
States Gypsum Co.,10 the case of the floating island. One party to the
case, the Houstons, owned Stack Island in the Mississippi River." The
other party, U.S. Gypsum, owned a tract of land on the east bank of
the river, along with "any islands located between the above described
lands [and] the Louisiana-Mississippi state line.' 2 At the time the ti-
tles were granted, one party's island was upstream from the stretch of
river described in the other party's deed.' 3 Over time, however, Stack
Island experienced erosion at the upstream end and deposition at the
downstream end. The result was to move the island south into the
stretch of river whose islands were included in U.S. Gypsum's property,
giving two parties legitimate claims to the same piece of real estate.' 4
If floating islands were the norm rather than the exception in the
world of real property, or if we lived in a world of shifting streams
where my front yard of yesterday was a river today and your back yard
tomorrow, it would be much harder to use the institutions of private
property and trade to control the use of land. In the world of intellec-
tual property, floating islands are the norm. Drawing clear boundaries
around an idea is a task that is rarely easy and often impossible. That
makes it difficult for parties to know whether their intended act in-
fringes someone else's property rights. When that act has occurred, it
makes it difficult for a court to resolve the resulting dispute. The prob-
lem. is further complicated by the fact that trespass on intellectual
property is often more difficult to observe than trespass on real
property.
A second source of difficulties in making a system of private prop-
erty work concerns the creation of property rights. In the context of
real property, this issue shows up in the literature on inefficient home-
steading." As the frontier moved west, a tract of land initially beyond
the frontier went from not worth cultivating to just breaking-even to
9. For a fascinating exploration of this topic in the very different context of primitive socie-
ties, see Martin Bailey, Approximate Optimality of Aboriginal Property Rights, 35 J.L. & ECON.
183 (1992).
10. 652 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1981).
11. Id. at 469.
12. Id. at 470.
13. Id. at 469-70.
14. Id. at 470. The court finessed the problem by deciding in favor of Houston on grounds-
of adverse possession. Id. at 475.
15. Peter J. Hill & Terry L. Anderson, Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?, 50 S.
ECON. J. 438 (1983); see also Peter J. Hill & Terry L. Anderson, The Evolution of Property
Rights: A Study of the American West, 28 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975).
[VOL. 19:31112
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producing a positive income. If property rights to land were acquired
by settlement, as they were under the Homesteading Act, individuals
had an incentive to settle prematurely. By bearing costs in the early
years of settlement, when the land was not yet worth cultivating, the
settlers received the right to the flow of future income from ownership
of the land. A settler who waited to settle land until it was actually
worth farming would arrive to find all of the good land already taken.
If all settlers were identical and information about land values was per-
fect, the land would be settled as soon as the present value of settling it
became positive. Under these circumstances, the effect of the Home-
steading Act. would have been to dissipate, in costs of premature settle-
ment, the entire land value of a large portion of the United States.
In the context of intellectual property, a similar problem appears
in the form of patent races. The social value of a particular invention
may be large, with the result that the inventor who secures the patent
can expect a large income from licensing fees. The social value of hav-
ing the invention made this week instead of next week is much less.
Since the patent goes to the first inventor, 16 however, the difference
between inventing this week and inventing next week may be the entire
value of the patent. Thus patent law may provide an incentive for an
inefficiently early invention.
At first glance, it seems strange to view an incentive to create in-
tellectual property as a possible disadvantage of intellectual property
law. A private property system's allocation of ownership of produced
goods, such as automobiles or wheat, to their producer is usually con-
sidered a desirable feature of such a system, since it gives the producer
an appropriate incentive to produce the goods. Patents and copyrights
are commonly defended as, among other things, devices to give creators
a reward for their creation and thus an incentive to create.
The difference between the cases of homesteading and patent races
on the one hand and automobiles (and as we will see, protection for
literary works against literal copying) on the other is that the former
cases do, and the latter do not, involve establishing a private property
claim to something that already exists and is already valuable. The
builder of an automobile or the grower of wheat uses only private prop-
erty as an input and pays its owners for it."' The homesteader, how-
ever, takes out of the common pool land that already exists and is al-
16. In most countries, the patent goes to the first inventor to file. In the United States, the
patent goes to the first to invent, determined in a somewhat complicated fashion, although the first
to file has substantial advantages in any subsequent litigation. The distinction is not important for
purposes of the present argument. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
17. In some cases, these forms of production may also use up a common resource, by pollut-
ing the atmosphere, say, or drawing down the water table. These situations lead to inefficiencies
1994] 1113
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ready valuable-land that would command a positive price if it were
auctioned. Less obviously, the inventor who patents a particular process
takes out of the common pool the ability to invent and practice that
process. Other potential inventors are worse off because they are no
longer free to do something that they might have done had the inventor
not made and patented the invention. In many cases this may be a
trivial loss. But the loss is not trivial if someone else was about to make
the same invention a week later, as in the case of a patent race. Nor is
the loss trivial if the invention is an obvious one, which anyone else
could have easily made as soon as use of the invention became worth-
while and which no one else is free to make once it has been patented. 18
A third problem with a system of private property is the cost of
transactions. The typical transaction in an economics textbook involves
one buyer, one seller, and one good. Imagine, however, the conse-
quences of a legal system which treated the English language as pro-
tectable property, with each new word belonging to its first user. A long
sentence concerning some rapidly developing field might require the au-
thor to first resolve the conflicting claims of a variety of putative first
users, then obtain licenses from three or four copyright owners. Writing
a book would involve similar negotiations with hundreds or even
thousands of parties. One solution to such a problem might be a system
of group licensing, such as that currently used for songs. Another
would be the system we in fact use: treating the language as a com-
mons. Similar arguments apply whenever a single activity, the building
of a machine or writing of a computer program, may infringe diverse
rights held by a large number of different claimants.
These arguments suggest three factors relevant to the costs of pro-
viding legal protection to some particular sort of intellectual property.
The first factor is the ease with which one can define and defend prop-
erty in that sort of idea. Greater difficulty in determining what is
owned and whether someone is trespassing results in higher costs of
protection. The second factor is the degree to which someone who cre-
ates and claims ownership in that particular sort of intellectual prop-
erty reduces, by so doing, the options available to other people. The
greater the size of such effects, the more likely it is that intellectual
property protection will result in expenditures, the consumption of real
resources, for the purpose of securing a claim to pre-existing property. 9
familiar in the literature on externalities and analogous to those discussed here for homesteading
and patents.
18. Under patent law as it actually exists, obvious inventions are not patentable. 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1988). That restriction can be interpreted as designed to avoid precisely this problem.
19. In the economics literature, this phenomenon is referred to as "rent seeking." See gener-
ally Anne Kruger, The Economics of the Rent Seeking Society, 64 AMER. ECON. REv. 291
1114 [VOL. 19:3
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The last factor is the difficulty of the transactions needed in order to
use the intellectual property. As these problems become more serious,
the gains from defining and enforcing property rights in ideas diminish.
Where the problems are sufficiently serious, we are better off with an
intellectual commons, a legal regime in which certain classes of ideas
are free for all to use, than with intellectual property.
One reason a commons may be a more attractive solution for con-
trolling the use of ideas than it is for controlling the use of land or
objects is that, while the number of people who can use a single auto-
mobile is limited, the number of people who can use a single idea is
not. Thus, one function of private property, resolving conflicts among
different people who wish to use the same piece of property at the same
time, is unnecessary in the case of intellectual property. From the
standpoint of a static analysis, in which goods, including ideas, already
exist and need only be allocated, the commons is the ideal institution
for allocating ideas. It may not, however, be the ideal institution for
producing them.
To this point I have been considering factors relevant to the costs
of intellectual property protection. These costs must be balanced
against the benefits: the production of more and better intellectual
property and better coordination of intellectual property once pro-
duced.2 0 Larger potential benefits lead to a willingness to bear greater
costs in order to get them.
The benefits from better incentives to produce something depend
in part on the product's supply curve. If we could produce all the wheat
anyone wanted at a cost of a penny a bushel, then even a system of
property rights that drastically under-rewarded the producer might still
produce plenty of wheat. 1 The relevant supply curve has qualitative as
well as quantitative dimensions. The existence of "shareware" word
processing programs is evidence that a significant number of such pro-
grams would be available even if there were no legal protection for
(1974); see also Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J. 224 (1967).
20. This latter point is central to the prospect theory of patent law, as developed by Ed-
mund Kitch. See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
EcoN. 265, 267-71 (1977) [hereinafter Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System].
His concern is largely with coordination in the process of producing further intellectual property.
Id. at 275-80. As we will see, it also provides one argument for protection of property in stan-
dards. See generally Edmund Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information,
9 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980) [hereinafter Kitch, The Law and Economics].
21. Economists may wish to translate the imprecise verbal argument presented here into
more precise statements about the consumer and producer surplus associated with various shapes
of supply and demand curves. The inefficiency due to a legal regime in which producers receive
only a fraction of the value of what they produce is analogous to excess burden in the conventional
analysis of taxation.
1994] 1115
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computer programs.22 The almost complete absence of "shareware"
word processing programs competitive in quality and features with suc-
cessful commercial programs," however, suggests that the quality sup-
plied, in the absence of legal protection, would be much lower than
what is now available.
A characteristic closely related to supply elasticity is ease of copy-
ing. If copying a particular sort of work is difficult and expensive, intel-
lectual property protection may be unnecessary.2" If copying is cheap
and easy, copies may drive the price that can be charged for the origi-
nal down so far that even something which can be produced quite inex-
pensively will not be produced in the absence of legal protection.
2 5
So one factor relevant to the value of intellectual property protec-
tion is -the shape of the supply curve. Another factor is the need for
coordination in production. As Edmund Kitch2" has pointed out, one
function of intellectual property is to give the owner both the ability
and the incentive to coordinate further developments within his
"claim." Where such coordination is important to the production of
further intellectual property, intellectual property protection is more
valuable than where development can proceed without any formal
coordination.27
We have now seen some of the important ways in which the char-
acteristics of different sorts of intellectual property affect the case for
or against protection. To what extent do such considerations explain
the pattern of intellectual property law as it has in fact developed?
22. Examples include Miniwriter, Flashwriter, and Anarcho in the Macintosh market and
Galaxy, Pedit, Ravitz Editor and PCWrite in the MSDos market.
23. PCWrite is the notable exception.
24. Consider a public lecture by a prominent figure or a class taught by a particularly
popular teacher. A reproduction, by an actor or a videotape, is a poor substitute for the original,
so giving the speaker or teacher a property right in his performance will have only a small effect
on the supply of such lectures and classes.
25. Consider the historical example of British writings in the United States at the beginning
of this century, when they were not legally protected. Because it was necessary for a pirate pub-
lisher to reset the type in order to copy the book, a process both costly and time consuming, a
legitimate publisher with access to the manuscript prior to its British publication had a significant
advantage over potential pirates. With modern printing technology the pirate could produce a
pirated edition rapidly and with lower fixed costs than the original publisher, free riding on the
publisher's typesetting as well as the author's expression. Legal protection for printed works is
consequently more important now than it was a hundred years ago. The argument applies a forti-
ori to computer programs, since copying costs are a much lower fraction of selling price for pro-
grams than for books.
26. See generally Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, supra note 20.
27. Another relevant factor, but one that will not be explored further here, is the availabil-
ity of substitutes for legal protection, such as secrecy. If denying legal protection to a particular
sort of intellectual property results in the producer's substitution of equally effective but more
costly alternatives, that is an argument in favor of providing legal protection. See David D. Fried-
man et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVEs 61 (1991).
[VOL. 19:31116
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III. PUTTING THINGS IN THE RIGHT BOXES: EXISTING LAW
Consider the earliest and most fundamental application of copy-
right law, the protection of literary works against literal copying. Lit-
eral copying of a literary work is easy to recognize, so it is easy to
defend and enforce the original author's property right. The chance
that one novelist will independently reproduce large parts of another
novelist's work is essentially zero, so someone who writes and copy-
rights a novel does not significantly reduce the opportunities available
to other writers.2" These arguments suggest that the costs of protection
against literal copying of literary works are small.
Whether the benefits of protection against literal copying of liter-
ary works is large or small is unclear. The coordination argument only
applies to the small fraction of all literary works likely to spawn deriva-
tive works. So far as elasticity of supply is concerned, it has been ar-
gued occasionally that the reward from copyright is unnecessary, since.
authors would write, and publishers publish, an adequate supply of
literature without it.29 Others have argued the opposite.30 One factor in
favor of protection is that literal copying of written works is an easy
task, making protection for written works more important than for, say,
performances. This is particularly true with modern printing technol-
ogy, since fixed costs are lower for the copier than for the original
publisher.
Since costs of intellectual property protection for literary works
are low and benefits may be high, strong protection is desirable. Copy-
rights are given easily, without any substantial requirements analogous
to the requirements of nonobviousness and utility in patent law, and
provide a long period of protection.
The case for the protection of inventions is much less clear. Draw-
ing a line around an idea in order to define what does or does not use
that idea is much more difficult than recognizing direct copying from a
literary work. The patenting of inventions involves a greater limitation
of others' activities than does the copyrighting of written works. Patent
law should be, and is, much more grudging in permitting the creators
of ideas to establish rights to those ideas, and much less generous in the
28. Copyrighting a novel does reduce other writers' opportunities to copy that novel. But
writing and copyrighting does not, since they could not have copied the novel if it had not been
written. Thus, copyright law does not give an inefficiently high incentive to write. It does give an
inefficiently high incentive to copyright works that would have been written even in the absence of
copyright.
29. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 292-302 (1970).
30. See generally Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection
for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971).
1994] 1117
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length of time for which protection is provided, than is copyright law.
The same arguments suggest that copyright law should, as it in fact
does, exclude from its protection the ideas embedded in literary works.
These arguments suggest that the allocation of new forms of intel-
lectual property to existing legal boxes makes sense in terms of the
relation between the characteristics of the new forms and the form of
protection appropriate for them. Where copying is easily accomplished
and easily recognized and independent invention unlikely, we would ex-
pect copyright law or something similar. We would even expect to see
copyright law applied to physical machines if the technology existed for
the cheap, easy, and recognizable copying of those machines.3 1 Where
copying is expensive and hard to recognize and independent invention
likely, we would expect to see something like patent protection. Where
the factors leading to high cost of property protection are combined
with factors leading to low benefits, we would expect to see no protec-
tion at all.32
This pattern explains the application of copyright law to literal
copying of computer programs. Machine language system software is
not a writing, but it shares with writings the features that make copy-
right law an appropriate form of protection. Like a writing, it is easily
copied. Literal copying is easy to prove. Independent invention is un-
likely.3 3 Therefore, it is not surprising that software is protected as if it
were a writing under present copyright law.
To this point I have considered only literal copying. Ordinary liter-
ary works are protected against nonliteral copying as well. The case for
such protection is less clear, both because the relevant lines are harder
to draw and because broader protection may establish rights that re-
duce the alternatives available to other writers. Copyright law attempts
to prevent that from happening through the doctrine of merger, under
which protection is severely restricted when it threatens to block the
only way, or one of a small number of possible ways, of expressing a
31. This is not merely a possibility from science fiction. The Florida plug mold statute over-
thrown in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157-68 (1989), was an
attempt to provide copyright-like protection against a technology for reproducing physical objects,
specifically boat hulls. The Mask Act and the acts providing protection against asexual and sexual
reproduction of plants are, in effect, special federal copyright laws applied to physical objects
rather than writings. A software pirate who transfers system software from one EPROM to an-
other is, in effect, photocopying a machine, and violating copyright law by doing so.
32. As mentioned earlier, one example of intellectual property for which there is almost no
legal protection is the English language; the inventor of a word ordinarily has no control over its
use by others. A partial exception is provided by trademark law.
33. Although something close to the original may be independently invented in special cir-
cumstances, such as the microcode for a central processing unit. See NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
No. C-84-20799-WPG, 1989 WL 67434 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989). An intermediate case, to be
discussed later, is reverse engineering driven by the need for compatibility.
[ OL. 19:31118
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particular idea.34 In the area of computer software, most current legal
uncertainty involves nonliteral copying. One of the central issues, and
the one that is the chief concern of this Article, is the copying of
standards.
IV. WHAT IS A STANDARD?
A producer does something in a particular way, such as making an
electric socket and an electric plug with a particular size and shape.
Suppose there are many other equally good forms that the plug and
socket might easily have taken. Once one form has been chosen, other
producers wish to imitate it, not because it is better than what they
could do themselves, but because consumers prefer all of their plugs to
fit into all of their sockets.
The size and shape of the plug are a standard. The plug itself may
not be. It may have many other features which are irrelevant to what
plugs fit into what sockets, the material it is made of, for example. In
this case, as in many more complicated ones, the standard is not a
product but a particular feature of a product.
Consider a word processor that commands a large portion of its
market, for example, Microsoft Word in the Macintosh market, or
Wordstar and later WordPerfect in the MSDos market. One possible
reason for using such a word processor may be that it is a good prod-
uct. Another is that the user wishes to be able to exchange documents
with other people who are using it. A third is that the institution using
it wishes to be able to hire secretaries without having to retrain them,
and new hires who are familiar with a word processor are likely to be
familiar with the dominant one.
The second objective applies to some individuals and institutions
but not to others, and satisfying it does not require the use of the domi-
nant product. Most word processors can save documents in a variety of
different formats, and programs exist for translating among formats. If
I wish to use WriteNow on the Macintosh and send my documents to
journals that use Word, I merely save my documents in Word format.
The format used for compatibility need not be the format of the domi-
nant product. If I wish to convert my documents from WriteNow on
the Macintosh to WordPerfect for Windows, I can do it by saving in
Rich Text Format, a standard invented by the producer of neither
product but supported by both.
34. The famous case applying this doctrine is Baker v. Selden, which held that the copy-
right on a book describing a new accounting system did not prevent others from printing forms for
that system, since the protection of expression could not be used to provide a monopoly on the idea
being expressed. 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880).
1994] 1119
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Satisfying the third objective without using the dominant product
is harder, but for many users the third objective is irrelevant. An au-
thor doing his own typing, for example, does not care what word
processors other people use, as long as he can exchange documents with
them. If an institution does wish to be compatible in this sense with the
dominant product, doing so may not require using that product. There
is the alternative of using -another product designed to be similar
enough so that a worker trained on one can easily learn the other.
The standard is not the product but one of the product's features,
such as the format it saves in or its user interface. The feature may be,
and often is, separable from the product. The particular feature that is
a standard may be other things as well, a writing or an invention, for
example. It is often useful to talk about standards as if a single thing or
feature either is or is not a standard. In fact, a particular feature of a
product may be valuable primarily because it is a standard, primarily
for reasons unrelated to its being a standard, or in part because it is a
standard and in part for other reasons.
A standard is not simply any product with a high market share.
Such a product is a standard in the sense in which I am using the term
only to the degree it is desirable because it has market share, which is
not at all the same thing as having market share because it is desirable.
If there is no significant benefit to using the same product as other
people, or if the benefit can be obtained in other ways, as in the exam-
ples above, then a product may have an arbitrarily high market share
without being a standard.
Contrary to what much of the literature seems to assume, the fact
that something is a standard is not necessarily an argument against
making it protectable intellectual property.3 5 As we will see in the next
section, the special features of standards provide arguments both for
and against protection. The fact that something is a standard provides
some arguments against giving it protection to which it otherwise
would be entitled. But there are also arguments for why something oth-
erwise unprotectable, such as the set of interface features that define an
35. This assumption seems to pervade the recent literature. Thus, for example, Jaap H.
Spoor, in an article that provides a clear discussion of the nature of standards, simply takes it for
granted that a product's status as a standard, insofar as it is legally relevant, is an argument
against protection. Jaap H. Spoor, Standardization and Exclusivity in Intellectual Property, in
INFORMATION LAW TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY 369-76 (Willem F. Korthals Altes et al. eds.,
1992). Similarly, Arthur R. Miller writes that "[t]he third category of criticism, the 'standardiza-
tion' argument, contends that the most economically and developmentally efficient use of the tech-
nology involves relaxing the copyright law in certain ways, to permit the standardization of com-
puter programs." Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases,
and Computer Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?., 106 HARV. L. REV. 978, 990
(1993).
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"IBM compatible" computer, ought to be protectable as a standard,
despite the fact that it does not meet the requirements of protection
under either copyright or patent law. Additionally, in some cases one
might argue that an item of intellectual property considered as a stan-
dard ought to belong to a different claimant than the same item consid-
ered as a writing or an invention.88
V. THE ECONOMICS OF STANDARDS
Ought standards to be protectable forms of intellectual property?
The arguments offered above suggest that the answer depends on a
number of factors. One is whether it is easy to define and protect prop-
erty rights in standards. For many sorts of standards, for example, size
and shape of electrical plugs and sockets, the answer is yes. For other
standards, it may be no. Consider the litigation between Apple and
Microsoft on whether or not Windows infringes on the look and feel of
the Macintosh interface.
A second relevant factor is whether the creation and legal protec-
tion of a standard reduce the opportunities available to other creators.
This is a more complicated issue in the context of standards than in the
context of either writings or inventions. One answer might be that it
does not, so long as the number of possible standards is large. A differ-
ent answer is that even if there are many alternatives that could have
been chosen, the fact that one alternative has become a standard may
eliminate the opportunity to choose another.
Consider the application of the patent race argument to standards.
If standards are very useful and shifting from one standard to another
is very difficult, there will be an automatic "first to invent" rule for
standards. Whichever standard comes first will be likely to go into gen-
eral use, blocking the adoption of other and perhaps superior standards.
If we give the inventor of a standard legal ownership of it, the inventor
will have an incentive to invent and implement a standard early. The
inventor will thus obtain a reward based not on the value of getting a
standard established a little sooner than it otherwise might have been,
but on the full value of having the standard.37
36. Thus, one could argue that the essential features of the Macintosh interface, if protect-
able as writings or inventions, belong to.Xerox, since they were invented at Xerox PARC; but that
as standards they belong to Apple, since it was the Macintosh that converted those features from
an idea into a standard.
37. A frequently cited example of an inefficient standard is the Qwerty keyboard layout. It
is claimed that Qwerty is much inferior to alternative standards, such as the Dvorak keyboard,
and owes its dominance entirely to the accident of being first. That claim is persuasively refuted
by S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis. See S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The
Fable of the Keys, 33 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1990). The authors argue that the inferiority of the
Qwerty keyboard to the competing Dvorak keyboard is a myth, largely created by the inventor of
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A third factor to consider in deciding what protection should be
given to standards is whether standards are easily supplied, so easily
that the additional incentive provided by legal protection is unneces-
sary. In many cases the answer may be yes. Some standards, however,
such as the Macintosh interface or the BIOS for the IBM PC, are com-
plicated constructions. In such cases, the availability and quality of the
standard may depend greatly on the reward provided, or not provided,
by intellectual property law.88
Even where inventing a standard is not costly, making it a stan-
dard may be. The Lotus menu tree, or some equally good alternative,
could perhaps have been designed in a few weeks by an intelligent .user
familiar with both Visicalc and the capabilities of the new IBM PC.
Converting a menu tree from a description on a piece of paper to a
standard in worldwide use, however, required massive expenditures to
produce and market a product using that standard. Where such ex-
penditures are necessary to make something a standard, and where the
existence of standards is valuable, the reward provided by the legal
ownership of the standard may provide an important incentive to pro-
duce it. 9
A fourth consideration in determining the appropriate level of pro-
tection of standards is whether it is important that someone own a stan-
dard in order to coordinate its future development. For simple stan-
dards, the answer is no. For complicated standards, it may be yes. One
reason for the Macintosh's ease of use was Apple's policy of defining
rules for both the user interface and the machine interface of Macin-
the latter. Id. Their evidence suggests that the initial adoption of the Qwerty standard took place
in a market with a variety of competing standards, where Qwerty would not have won out had any
of the alternatives been clearly better. Id. Their arguments also suggest that Qwerty could not
have maintained its dominant position against a clearly superior rival, since either firms employing
typists or firms selling typewriters based on the new standard would have found it worth bearing
the costs of conversion, and the rest of the market would have gradually followed them. Id. It is
worth noting that August Dvorak held a patent on the keyboard he designed and thus (temporary)
ownership over his standard.
38. In considering the cost of producing a standard or getting one adopted, it is important to
remember that standards often come embedded in goods, making the standard and the good joint
products. A word processor must have both a user interface and a format for saving files, whether
or not they are destined to become industry standards. In deciding how much to spend on produc-
ing a better interface or format, or-one more suited to be adopted as a standard, the producer
under a legal regime where standards are protectable will consider both the value of producing a
better product and the value of producing a better standard. If standards are not protectable, the
producer has less incentive to design a good interface. If the status of a product as a standard (as
well as a writing or invention) removes protection it would otherwise have had, the designer may
even have an incentive to avoid designing an interface well adapted to becoming a standard.
39. One might argue that the failure of the English language to develop gender neutral
pronouns reflects the absence of legal rules, such as property in language, to reward those who
invent and popularize linguistic innovations.
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tosh software and pressuring software producers to follow them."' That
policy was made possible by Apple's control over the Macintosh and its
software, enforced not by legal protection of the interface,4 but by le-
gal protection of the Macintosh ROMs. As long as Apple was the only
company that could make Macintosh-compatible computers, it had an
incentive to invest resources in maintaining a consistent standard for
Macintosh software, thus raising the value of the hardware that ran it.
Furthermore, Apple's control over Macintosh hardware provided it
with leverage to use in persuading software producers to follow its
guidelines, since only by so doing could they guarantee compatibility
with the next revision of the ROMs and system software."2
Even if coordination is important, ownership of a standard is not
the only possible way to have standards developed. One alternative is to
have standards set by government agencies. Another alternative is to
have standards designed by committees established by professional as-
sociations or groups of manufacturers and voluntarily adopted by firms
wishing to produce mutually compatible products. The viability of
those alternatives is another consideration relevant to whether stan-
dards ought to receive protection.
Opponents of protection for standards have sometimes argued that
such protection would force competing firms to adopt inconsistent stan-
dards. A central element of a market system, however, is trade for mu-
tual advantage. If a particular standard is much more valuable when
widely used, then the owner of the standard has an incentive to license
it widely.43 Such contracting has costs, however. If property protection
40. This policy led to the use of the term "interface police" within the Macintosh developer
community.
41. An unsuccessful attempt was made to get legal protection of the interface in Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925, 931 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
42. This discussion involves two different sorts of standards. The user interface standard
was presumably enforced by a policy of favoring, in various ways, software producers who adhered
to it, and by Apple's policy of following it in its own software (with some notable exceptions). The
machine interface standard was enforced by announcing that software that did not follow certain
rules might not work with future revisions of the hardware and operating system. Control of both
standards depended on Apple's monopoly of Macintosh compatible hardware. Such control, how-
ever, could have been maintained without such a monopoly if Apple had secure property rights in
its interface. The nearest equivalent in the MSDOS world was the control exercised to some degree
by Microsoft, which had a near-monopoly in system software and could use copyright law to
control the use and development of its system software.
43. This point was made by Judge Keeton in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,
740 F. Supp. 37, 79 (D. Mass. 1990). While the argument seems convincing, it is not clear
whether it is consistent with the evidence. Two particularly striking cases are Apple's refusal (with
one minor exception) to license its ROMs to other computer manufacturers and Apple's failure to
license its entire interface to Microsoft. Windows 3 might have been a much better product if
Microsoft had not felt constrained to avoid too much similarity to the Macintosh interface. The
failure to license the interface is particularly puzzling considering that the market for MSDos
compatible system software is many times larger than the market for Macintosh compatible sys-
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provided no benefit and standards required no coordination and were
easily produced, it would be even easier to get consistency by treating a
standard as common property and allowing anyone to follow it. That is
how we treat the English language, probably the most complicated as
well as the most widely used standard employed by our society.
These arguments suggest three alternative ways in which the law
might treat standards. One alternative is to decide whether standards
typically fit into the copyright or the patent box and classify them ac-
cordingly as writings, discoveries, or if they fit into neither box, unpro-
tectable. A second alternative would be to construct legal rules
designed to distinguish among standards according to which box, if ei-
ther, they fit into. A third alternative would be to construct a sui
generis form of protection, as has been done for computer chip masks,
plant reproduction, and (unsuccessfully) boat hulls.
VI. THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STANDARDS IN COMPUTER LAW
A number of early cases in computer law"4 dealt with protection of
standards. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.," for
example, Judge Sloviter held that Franklin was not entitled to copy
Apple software even if doing so was the only practical way of making a
computer capable of running software written for the Apple II." He
held that while the doctrine of merger might prevent Apple from copy-
righting the only way of accomplishing some task, such as compiling
source code into-object code, Franklin's claim that there were a limited
number of ways of making its operating system capable of running pro-
tern software, implying that there would be large gains available to be divided between the parties
to such an agreement. One possible explanation is that Apple and Microsoft were concerned that
such an agreement might provoke antitrust action against them.
44. I have not yet made any serious attempt to investigate the status of standards elsewhere
in copyright (or patent) law. One point worth noting is that the scenes a faire exception to copy-
right protection, although usually considered an implication of the doctrine that copyright protec-
tion of expression cannot be used to protect ideas, might instead be viewed as a doctrine designed
to refuse protection to standards. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738
(9th Cir. 1971).
Consider the description of a southern mansion used in Gone With the Wind to represent the
antebellum South. It is commonly said that copyright law cannot prevent another author or film
producer from using a similar scene, because it is one of a small number of ways of representing
that particular idea. One might argue, however, that there are a multitude of ways in which
Margaret Mitchell might have represented the idea, and it is only the fact that she chose to
represent it in a particular way in a very popular novel, later made into one of the most successful
movies ever produced, that established it as the standard representation. If so, the arguments used
by Judge Keeton in Lotus suggest that such depictions ought to be held to violate her copyright.
45. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
46. Id. at 1253-54.
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grams designed for the Apple II "has no pertinence to either the idea/
expression dichotomy or merger."47
The first case I know of which explicitly raised the issue of stan-
dards in the computer context was Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University
Computing Co."' Synercom Technology ("Synercom") modified a pub-
lic domain stress analysis program in order to make it easier to use and
spent a considerable amount of money familiarizing customers with its
use.' 9 University Computing Company ("UCCV) took a different pub-
lic domain stress analysis program and modified it to accept input data
in the formats invented and popularized by Synercom.6 0 Synercom sued
for violation of its copyright on the input formats.6 1 In his decision,
Judge Higgenbotham analogized the Synercom formats to the H-shift
pattern of an automobile stick shift.6 2 He argued that such a standard
was properly classified as an idea rather than an expression, and was
thus unprotectable under copyright law.6"
The most important cases with successful infringement claims are
Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International6 ' and
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.55 The relevant
standard was the Lotus menu tree-the way in which the commands
the user could give the spreadsheet were organized and represented.
Paperback Software's VP Planner used the same menu tree as Lotus 1-
2-3 in order to make it easy for users familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 to
switch to VP Planner. Judge Keeton held that copying the menu tree
47. Id. at 1253.
48. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978). This case was decided before the 1980 amend-
ments to the Copyright Act and about the same time as the release of the CONTU report on
which those amendments were based. See CONTU, supra note 5. Since Judge Higgenbotham
treated the contested formats as material that would be protectable under copyright law save for
the problem of merger, it is not clear that his verdict would have been any different had the case
been decided a few years later.
49. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1006-08.
50. Id. at 1009.
51. Id. at 1009-14. The case also involved a separate issue of copyright infringement due to
UCC's copying of Synercom manuals. UCC lost on that issue but won on the format issue. Id.
52. Id. at 1013.
53. Id.
54. 740 F. Supp. 37 (Mass. 1990).
55. 831 F. Supp. 223 (Mass. 1993). Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labs, Inc., 797
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), is an important case in which the judge declined to follow Judge Hig-
genbotham in drawing the line between idea and expression, but what was being copied in that
case was not a standard but the internal structure-of a program. Id. It seems clear from the facts
of the case that the reason the Defendant Jaslow copied the claimant Dentalab's product Dentcom
in writing was to save the work of redesigning the program from scratch, not to make it easier for
users familiar with the earlier program to use the latter. Id. at 1231. Dentcom ran on smaller and
less expensive computers than Dentalab, so it was unlikely that a customer already equipped to
run Dentalab would consider switching to Dentcom. Id. at 1226.
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infringed Lotus' copyright in its program. 6 He argued that, because
there were many equally good ways in which the commands might
have been organized, Paperback was not protected by the doctrine of
merger." In Borland, Judge Keeton ruled that a copy of the Lotus
menu tree infringed Lotus' copyright even when it was invisible to the
user, embedded in Borland software used to translate Lotus macros.6 8
He thus followed Judge Sloviter rather than Judge Higgenbotham,
holding that copyright could be used to prevent a competitor from pro-
ducing compatible software. As a defense of protection for standards,
Judge Keeton's position goes farther than Judge Sloviter's. Whereas
Franklin had copied fourteen complete programs from Apple, Paper-
back and Borland had copied a small part of Lotus' program, and one
embodying little effort or creativity,59 so they might have been entitled
to exemption under the doctrine of fair use.
A recent case ruling against protection of standards is Sega Enter-
prises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.6 0 The issue in this case was whether a
company that wished to make computer game cartridges compatible
with the Sega game console was entitled to disassemble Sega's code in
order to figure out how to do so, and to include a short segment from
Sega's compatibility code in their own cartridges.61 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that both the disassembly and the copying were
permissible under the fair use exception to the copyright code.
What, then, is the current status of protection for standards in the
context of software copyright? This question involves three separate is-
sues. The first is whether a standard itself can be copyrighted.
Synercom appears to answer that it cannot, while the two Lotus cases
imply a standard can be copyrighted. 62 The second issue is whether
material that must be copied in order to make it practical to follow a
standard may be barred from copyright protection by the principle of
merger, on the theory that a standard is an idea and copyright law may
not be used, even indirectly, to protect ideas. That is the theory re-
56. Borland, 831 F. Supp. at 245.
57. Id. at 234.
58. Id.
59. Borland copied only the structure of the menu tree, expressed by the initial letters used
to implement commands, not its entire representation. Id. at 226.
60. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
61. Id. at 1528. There was also a trademark issue, which is not relevant to the topic of this
paper and will therefore not be discussed here.
62. Lotus presumably could not have prevailed in a suit to prevent the publisher of an in-
struction manual, a textbook on interface design, or a legal casebook from describing its menu
tree, since such uses would almost certainly have been permitted under the fair use exception. It
was the fact that Paperback was free riding on Lotus's efforts in making Lotus 1-2-3 an industry
standard that was the basis for legal protection-the same basis that was rejected in Synercom.
See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
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jected in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,6" but ar-
guably accepted in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., " at least
to the extent that the latter case justified the inclusion of a small piece
of Sega's code in the Accolade game cartridges on the theory that it
was necessary for compatibility.65 Finally, there is the issue of whether
copyright law can be used to maintain trade secrecy for a standard.
Sega claimed the right to use copyright law to prevent the copying and
disassembly of its compatibility code, and thus to maintain as a trade
secret the requirements for compatible cartridges. The court rejected
this claim, 6 holding that copying Sega's code for the purpose of disas-
sembling it so as to discover the ideas necessary to produce compatible
cartridges was fair use if there was no other way of getting the
information.6 7
The Ninth Circuit's language in Sega suggests the possibility of a
rule more hostile to the protection of property in computer programs
than any of these.68 "In order to enjoy a lawful monopoly over the idea
or function underlying a work, the creator of the work must satisfy the
more stringent standards imposed by the patent laws." 69 This language
raises the issue of preemption of trade secret protection by federal
copyright law, the copyright equivalent of patent preemption in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,70 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., 1 and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 2
If copyright protection is limited when disassembly is the only way
of getting at the unprotected ideas behind the protected expression of a
machine language program, as the Sega court suggests, what does that
imply for situations where even disassembly is inadequate to get at the
ideas? In a world where disassembly is legal but where copyright own-
ers still wish to keep the underlying ideas of their programs secret,
63. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
64. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
65. Alternatively, one may read the case as holding that the copying was fair use because
such a small amount of material was copied, although it is not clear that it was less than what was
copied by Borland from Lotus.
66. An earlier case, Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988),
produced a similar result but justified the result by a very broad interpretation of the Copyright
Act Section 117(1) exception to the right to forbid copying. Id.
67. The same result is explicit in Article 1, paragraph 2 and Article 6, paragraph I of the
Council of the European Communities Directive on the Protection of Computer Programs. See
Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L
* 122) 112.
68. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 1526 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159-
64 (1989)).
70. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
71. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
72. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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there may be a market for compilers designed to produce code that is
difficult to disassemble. Carried to its logical conclusion, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's position could be an argument for requiring copyright registra-
tions of programs to include the complete source code, thus making the
ideas freely available to competitors, as is now supposed to happen
under the disclosure requirements of patent law.
VII. Do WE NEED A NEW Box?
The implications of these arguments for what the law ought to be
depend on the technology of producing, popularizing, developing, and
changing standards. The arguments also depend, as do most conclu-
sions about legal rules, on how good the courts are at recognizing the
relevant distinctions. If the best that courts can be expected to do is to
distinguish things that are standards from things that are not, then we
must decide what legal regime is best for standards in general and ac-
cept the fact that whatever regime we choose will be inappropriate for
some particular standards. If courts can make finer distinctions be-
tween standards that are easy to invent (the Lotus menu tree) and
those that are difficult to invent (the Macintosh interface), we may
have the option of tailoring protection to the standard being protected.
For standards that are easily produced, meaning both that they
are easily devised and that they can come into general use without ex-
tensive marketing efforts by their inventors, the correct rule is probably
no protection. For standards that are expensive either to devise or to
establish or both, the desirability of protection depends on two factors:
how easily the inventor can get a return by combining an unprotectable
standard with a protectable product, and how difficult it is, if the stan-
dard is protectable, to negotiate the licensing agreements required to
put it into general use.
If we believe that the circumstances that make protection desira-
ble are common, and that where protection is undesirable it also does
little harm, perhaps because it is reasonably easy to switch from one
standard to another," we should favor copyright protection for stan-
dards, accepting the result in Lotus and rejecting the result in
73. This is part of the argument made by Liebowitz and Margolis for why the Qwerty
standard would not have survived had it been significantly inferior to alternatives such as the
Dvorak keyboard. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 37. Another argument that they offer is
that the choice of the initial standard is the result of a competitive process, in which users attempt
to coordinate on the most attractive of several alternative standards. Id. In a world where legal
protection is available for standards, the fact that the producer of a particular standard asserted
proprietary rights to it might be a reason for users to reject it in favor of some public domain
alternative. One notable example was the competition between alternative bus designs for MSDos
computers, with the proprietary design that IBM implemented in some of its PS/2 models losing
out to the non-proprietary alternative proposed and implemented by a group of its competitors.
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Synercom. Under the opposite assumptions, we should follow the courts
that have held, implicitly or explicitly, that standards are not
copyrightable.
An alternative approach might be to protect standards under pat-
ent law rather than under copyright law. Patent law, unlike copyright
law, is designed to limit its protection to innovations that are large
enough to be worth protecting. 7"' Patent law protection may be effective
for standards that are expensive to devise. Standards that are inexpen-
sive to devise and expensive to establish, however, would be rejected as
obvious, and thus unpatentable under present law.
Finally, we might try to devise a new set of legal rules specifically
tailored to protect those standards, and only those standards, that de-
serve protection. Factors such as the cost of inventing a standard and
getting it adopted, the ease with which users could move between stan-
dards, and perhaps even the willingness of the owner of a standard to
license it to others, would then become legally relevant to the degree of
protection offered.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the course of this Article, I have tried to establish two broad
propositions. The first is that intellectual property law, both as it exists
and as it ought to exist, may be interpreted as an attempt to adapt
legal rules to the differing costs and benefits of creating, defending, and
exchanging property in different sorts of intellectual creations. The sec-
ond is that our legal system ought to take account of the special char-
acteristics of standards in determining what sort of protection they
should have, since standards are a special sort of intellectual creation. I
have not tried to carry the argument to its conclusion: a set of recom-
mendations for how the law ought to treat standards. One reason is
that I believe the economics of network externalities require more anal-
ysis than has yet been done. Another is that, even if the analysis were
complete, the conclusions depend on facts about the market for stan-
dards, both in software and in other fields, which I, at least, do not
know.
74. This requirement appears in the form of "sufficient invention" or "flood of genius" in
the old cases and in the requirement of nonobviousness in the current law. See 35 U.S.C. § 103
(1988).
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